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Love me, Love My Dog: An Experimental Study on Social 
Connections and Indirect Reciprocity 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper conducts a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of 
social connections in behavioral indirect reciprocity. We provide the evidence of 
spillover effects of social ties, e.g., the recipient’s indirect reciprocal act varies with 
the relations between the donor and a third party. Naturally occurring friendship is 
employed to study social connections. Thus, a beneficiary might either be a “friend” 
or a “stranger” of the donor. We demonstrate that knowing social connections 
significantly increases the recipient’s repayment only if the donor is kind enough in 
the first place. Overall, recipients’ indirect reciprocity almost doubles when 
introducing social networks among donors and beneficiaries. It is also shown that this 
spillover effect is unlikely the result of recipients’ perception of donors’ expectations. 
Major theories of social preferences, e.g., fairness, intention-based, guilt-aversion, 
cannot offer satisfactory explanations of our findings. We propose an explanation 
based on in-group and out-group differences but with endogenous group status, in 
which social connections play a crucial role. 
Key words: indirect reciprocity, social connections, spillover, social preferences 
JEL codes: C91, D03, D85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
1. Introduction 
It is well established that individuals usually exhibit reciprocal behavior in 
bilateral relationships, even in the absence of any contractual requirements or future 
interactions (Berg et al, 1995; McCabe et al, 1998).
4
 As in the standard investment 
game, this reciprocal tendency, though violates self interests, often improves social 
welfare. In the real world, the possibility of directly reciprocating other’s kindness is 
usually limited, since the high frequency of anonymous interactions makes the donor 
untraceable. As a consequence, to sustain mutual cooperation in a large group, it is 
crucial that there exists wide-spread indirect reciprocity, i.e., upon receiving other’s 
help, the recipient is willing to return kindness to a third party who didn’t help him 
before. 
5
 
This paper addresses the role of social connections in indirect reciprocal 
behavior. Previous studies suggest that since social networks facilitate information 
sharing or enforce social punishment (Greif, 1994; Kranton, 1996; Greiner and 
Levatti, 2005; Jackson, 2008), they affect the players’ incentives to build up 
reputations in repeated interactions, consequently promote cooperative behavior. 
However, social relations might affect indirect reciprocal behavior even in one-shot 
interactions. We employ an indirect investment game (Dufwenberg et al., 2001; 
Buchan et al., 2003), which consists of donors, recipients, and beneficiaries, to 
understand non-strategic indirect reciprocity. Not only could social connections 
directly affect the behavior, e.g., the donor will be nicer to a socially close recipient, 
but also they indirectly influence the recipients’ acts toward a third party, e.g., the 
social relations between the donor and the beneficiary might affect the recipient’s 
behavior toward the latter. Our experiment is used to detect the second aspect, e.g., 
the spillover effects of social connections.  
Many real-world examples about the spillover effect of social relations motivate 
our design: It is common to see people becoming nicer to a stranger if they learn that 
the stranger is a friend of somebody who happened to help them before. The business 
partners of a family corporate founder are more willing to help the founder’s kin heir 
than an outsider. The operations of political dynasties in the democracies like Japan, 
Philippines rely on that voters are willing to elect the heir of the politician who did 
favor to them before.
6
 Although sometime these spillover effects are not one-shot ex 
post, but ex ante the repeated interaction might not be the players’ expectation. And it 
is quite likely that the indirect reciprocity itself makes their interaction repeated, or 
establishes new social networks. Therefore, the analysis about the "start-point" of 
connections is important as well.
 7
 We suggest that the value of social connections 
                                           
4 Cox (2004), Ashraf et al (2006) have considered reciprocity as actions conditional on the actions or intentions of 
others, thus distinguished it from conventional other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000). Assessing the relative strength of these two types of preferences, however, is not our concern.  
5 In Nowak and Sigmund (2005) this is defined as “upstream reciprocity”, just one type of indirect reciprocity. 
However, since we exclusively focus on this kind of indirect reciprocity, we use the general term “indirect 
reciprocity” to refer to it. 
6 Finan and Schechter (2012) show that social preferences play a role in vote-buying behavior in Paraguay. In 
particular, the politicians will target on reciprocal individuals. This shows the strategic use of non-strategic 
motivations in the arena of political competition. 
7 Understanding the meeting process prior to forming links is crucial to generate the network resembling real 
social networks. Jackson and Rogers (2007) show that a dynamic model of network formation in which nodes 
could be greatly enhanced because the more nodes a person connects to, the more he 
might benefit from the connections’ kind behavior.  
The presence of spillover effect might be due to that recipients feel obligated to 
reward a third party connecting with a kind donor. In other words, social ties 
themselves generate the spillover effect. Alternatively, perhaps recipients perceive 
that a nice donor hopes him to reward a connected beneficiary, so social ties generate 
spillover effect since they convey the donors’ implicit expectation. To assess these 
two possible channels, we also examine the role of expressed expectations in indirect 
reciprocal behavior. 
Our laboratory experiment extends the standard investment game to a 
multilateral setting. In this game, a donor can choose to transfer a certain amount to a 
recipient, and this amount will be tripled by the experimenter. The recipient then 
decides how much to repay to a randomly selected beneficiary. We run four 
treatments: The Direct reciprocity (standard investment game), Baseline, Connection 
and Message Treatments. The game design in the Baseline Treatment is the same as 
just described above. In the Connection Treatment, there might exist social ties 
(friendship) between the donor and the beneficiary, and only the recipient (not the 
donor) was informed whether the donor and the beneficiary were friends.
8
 In the 
Message Treatment, the donor could send a costly message to the recipient asking for 
a favorable treatment on the beneficiary.  
We observe significant amounts of repayment in all treatments, which suggests 
considerable non-strategic pure indirect reciprocal behavior. After controlling for the 
amount of donors’ transfer, the Friend Treatment shows the significant impact of 
social connections on the indirect reciprocal behavior. The recipient will repay more 
to a beneficiary connected with the donor if the donor’s initial transfer is high. This a 
clear evidence of the positive spillover effect of social ties. Compared with the 
indirect reciprocal acts in the Baseline treatment, recipients are nicer to the friends of 
the donor, instead of being worse to the non-friends of the donor. In effect, we find 
that the Friend Treatment almost doubles B's indirect reciprocity ratio compared to 
the Baseline. On the other hand, we could not find out any significant effect of 
sending message in the Message Treatment, suggesting that the donor’s expressed 
expectations plays a relatively minor role in the recipient’s indirect reciprocal acts. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the observed significant effect of connections is due to 
recipients’ perception of the donor’s expectations. Our experimental results thus cast 
doubts on the role of recipients’ belief in indirect reciprocal behavior.  
The most prominent existing theories of social preferences, e.g., outcome-based 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), intention-based (Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and 
Kirchstaiger, 2004), type-based (Levine, 1998) and guilty-aversion (Charness and 
Dufwenberg), are not be able to provide a convincing explanation of the observed 
indirect reciprocal behavior. Therefore, by extending Malmendier and Schmidt (2012), 
                                                                                                                         
might form links with friends of friends could result in many features exhibited by large social networks. Our 
findings also have the potential to provide a micro-foundation for the meeting process in their model, e.g., a friend 
might have the incentive to introduce her friend to you if she foresees that you will return more kindness to her 
friend. 
8 In this experiment, we use naturally occurring friendship to represent social connections. It is reasonable to 
presume that the social distance between friends is shorter than that between non-friends. 
we propose an explanation based on in-group favoritism, but with endogenous group 
formation and transitive social connections. High initial transfer creates social ties 
between donors and recipients, when the donor and the beneficiary has closer social 
distance, the kindly treated recipient cares the beneficiary’s welfare more, 
consequently repay more to her. Thus, indirect reciprocity could flow through social 
connections.  
This paper is related to several lines of research. Indirect reciprocity can be 
motivated by various reasons. The existing literature has primarily focused on 
strategic incentives, e.g., reputation-building (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 
1998, 2005; Seinen and Schram, 2006). Such strategic motives rely on repeated 
interaction and information transmission. However, it has been shown that indirect 
reciprocity exists even in one-shot interactions (Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Engelmann 
and Fischbacher, 2009). This finding significantly expands the scope for indirect 
reciprocity to maintain mutual cooperation in large groups, where information 
transmission is either too noisy or too slow to effectively build up reputation. Among 
these studies, Dufwenberg et al. (2001), Guth et al. (2001), Buchan et al. (2002) and 
Stanca (2009) have developed a one-shot four-person investment game, in which two 
pairs of donor and recipient consist a group. Instead of reciprocating to their own 
donors, the recipients could only repay to the donor previously not matched with. 
These papers demonstrate the existence of indirect reciprocity, even in the absence of 
incentives for strategic reputation building.
9
 However, there is no conclusive 
comparison between the strength of indirect reciprocity and that of direct one. Besides, 
the intrinsic motivations of indirect reciprocity remain unclear. 
Previous studies have found a decrease in perceived social distance increases 
cooperative behavior in bilateral interactions. A variety of methods are implemented 
to manipulate the social distance in laboratory, e.g., wording on the instructions 
(Hoffman et al. 1996; Buchan et al, 2002), revelation of the names of players 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2008), hypothetic social distances (Buchan and Croson, 2004), 
naturally occurring friends like Chinese undergraduate classmates (Song et al, 2012), 
etc.. The most common experimental manipulation employed is ad hoc group 
discussion procedure, in which participants are randomly assigned to different groups 
to discuss an assigned topic irrelevant to experiments for a short time period (Buchan 
et al, 2006). These papers demonstrate that the amount of reciprocity declines 
significantly with respect to the manipulated social distance. Our concept of social 
connections, however, differs from social distances discussed in the above papers in 
that the social distance in these papers measure social closeness between donors and 
recipients, but social connections in our paper reflect social relations between donors 
and beneficiaries. Therefore, while in the previous works it is difficult to distinguish 
the role of social distance in investing and returning behavior,
10
 our design clearly 
demonstrates that social relations affect both the target and the amount of indirect 
reciprocity. In fact, the social distance between donors and recipients remain the same 
in our experiment.  
                                           
9 Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) have conducted a repeated helping game similar to Nowak and Sigmund 
(1998) and Seinen and Schram (2006). By controlling the information feedbacks in the experiment, they provide 
evidence for pure indirect reciprocity. 
10 In effect, the trust game experiment by Bicchieri et al (2011) shows that there is no difference in agents’ beliefs 
regarding trusting friends and trusting strangers. However, in their experiment it seems that there is a norm of 
reciprocity conditional on social distances. 
Our paper is structured as the follows: Section 2 lays out the experimental design 
and procedures; Section 3 describes the theoretical predictions; Section 4 presents the 
experimental results; Section 5 discusses possible explanations for our results, and 
proposes our explanation based on endogenous group formation. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
2.1 Experimental design 
The basic design is similar to the investment game but with indirect reward 
(Dufwenberg et al. 2001, Buchan et al. 2002). There are two groups of subjects: 
Group A plays the role of donors/beneficiaries (A) and group B plays the role of 
recipients. Their roles are fixed during the experiment. We have four treatments: the 
Direct reciprocity treatment (standard investment game) as the control, the Baseline 
treatment, the Connection Treatment, and the Message Treatment. Here we clarify the 
latter three treatments. 
In the Baseline (Stranger) Treatment, subjects in group A and group B receive an 
endowment of 30 RMB and 10 RMB, respectively. In stage 1, each subject in group A 
(Ai) plays the role of donor and decides how much of the 30 RMB she wants to 
transfer to a randomly and anonymously paired subject in group B (Bi). Any amounts 
offered Xi are tripled by the experimenter and sent to the paired subject. In stage 2, 
the recipient Bi will meet a randomly selected anonymous person in group A (Ak). 
Without knowing Ak’s transfer decision in stage 1, Bi decides how to split his total 
wealth, i.e., the sum of his initial endowment plus the tripled amount he received, 
between himself and Ak. The amount Bi sent to Ak is denoted by Yi. We can see that 
each subject in group A plays both the role of donor in stage 1 and that of beneficiary 
in stage 2, but paired with different subject B in these two stages. For instance, the 
beneficiary Ak is paired with Bk in stage 1 and makes transfer Xk, but receives 
repayment Yi from another Bi in stage 2, as Figure 1 illustrates.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
The Connection (Friend) Treatment is similar to the Baseline Treatment, except 
that in stage 2 Bi will learn whether Ai and Ak are connected (friends) after receiving 
Xi and before repaying Yi. However, it is public information that none of the subjects 
in group A knows the connections. Figure 2 illustrates the design.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
The Messages Treatment differs from the Baseline Treatment in that after Ai 
makes a transfer in stage 1, she has the option to send a structured message to Bi with 
the content “Please be kind to Ak”. The message will cost Ai 1 RMB. Ak doesn’t 
know whether Bi receives a message. Figure 3 illustrates the design. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
To collect enough data with reasonable cost, and to address the potential problem 
that agents may need some experience to actually understand the game (Charness and 
Kuhn, 2010), in each treatment the subjects play the same game six times with 
different counterparties. We make sure (the subjects also knew it) that no subject 
could be re-matched with the same subject at a later point in the experiment. To avoid 
potential learning effects and strategic reputation-building, the amount Yi was never 
revealed to Ai and Ak, and so there was no feedback on group A’s payoff during the 
experiment.  
 
2.2 Experimental procedures 
The experiment sessions were conducted in Southwestern University of Finance 
and Economics (SWUFE), China, in 2012. A total of 120 individuals participated in 
the four treatments. Sessions took about one hour.  
Half of the subjects were recruited from two students clubs (henceforth club 
members), with 30 coming from the chorus club and the others from the orchestra 
club. Subjects in the same club knew each other well and were naturally occurring 
friends.
 11
 In each treatment, clubs members were assigned to group A, corresponding 
to the role of “donors/beneficiaries”. The remaining subjects (henceforth non-club 
participants) were recruited by posting notices on campus intranet discussion board 
and had “recipients” designation (group B) in each treatment. Most participants were 
undergraduates at SWUFE. Most of them have taken introductory economics, but no 
one has prior experience with an investment game. To control the possible 
information leaking among participants in different treatments, we ran four sessions 
simultaneously, each corresponding to one treatment. 
We recruit naturally occurring connected subjects to form group A mainly 
because of building up reliable connections for the Connection Treatment. As Buchan 
et al. (2006) demonstrate, a laboratory group formation manipulation might not be 
applicable for Chinese subjects, because of the collectivist cultural inclination. 
Therefore, bringing naturally occurring social relations to the laboratory is more 
convincing in our setting.  
The experimental sessions were run manually. For each treatment, club members 
and non-club participants were equally allocated to the group A and group B rooms, 
respectively, with each club contributing the same number of participants in the group 
A room. To implement the Connection Treatment, on the outset of the session we put 
all club members and non-club participants in one single room. The non-club 
participants were seated in the middle of the classroom, and the members of the two 
clubs were seated in the two sides of the room, respectively. To make it more credible 
that the connection is not the outcome of laboratory manipulation, a randomly chosen 
member from each club said “Hello, we are from the university chorus (orchestra) 
club” to the non-club participants on behalf of his/her club. 
In each room A and room B, subjects were randomly assigned an identification 
number and sat in the assigned place. They received a specific instruction that 
illustrated the game with figures and numerical examples. Participants were asked to 
complete a short quiz to make sure that they completely understood the game.  
                                           
11 After discussion with the instructors of the clubs and the members, we confirm that there are many regular group 
activities within each club, hence we could infer that they are both quite cohesive and form close ties. Besides, 
their group identities are quite similar (both are music clubs) in front of the outsiders. The demographic 
characteristics of these two clubs are also similar. 
The experiment formally began at that point. We first describe the procedure of 
the Baseline Treatment. Experimenters used decision record forms and envelops to 
communicate role A’s and B’s decisions to each other in a double-blind procedure. 
Each subject in role A first played the role of donor and wrote down his/her transfer to 
B in the decision record form and put this into an envelope. Experimenters then 
collected the envelopes and delivered them to the experimenters in the room of role B 
who tripled the amounts transferred, placed the forms back into the envelopes, and 
distributed the envelops to the matched subjects in role B. To facilitate implementing 
the experiment, with a little abuse of terminology, in each round the subjects were 
informed about the “group” they belonged to. Each “group” consists of a donor (Ai), a 
reciprocator (B), and a beneficiary (Ak). The labeled number of “group” varied across 
rounds. And the subjects were assigned to different “groups” in different rounds. The 
number of group is written on the decision record form. 
Upon receiving transfers, each subject in the role B wrote down his/her decision 
on the repayment in the form, and put the form into the envelop again. Experimenters 
then collected the envelopes and gave them to the research assistant in the control 
room who recorded all the decisions by participant identification number in isolation.  
In the Connection Treatment, after the recipient received the decision record form 
from the paired donor, he/she was informed privately by the experimenter about 
whether the donor and the beneficiary were “friends”, but not about which club they 
were from. To send a message in the Messages Treatment, in the room of role A, two 
additional notes were distributed to each donor after they completed the decision 
record forms. One note was blank, and the other was written with the sentence “Please 
be kind to Ak ”. The donor decided which note to be delivered to the recipient 
together with the decision record form in the sealed envelope.   
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a short post-
experiment questionnaire for their demographic information. After completing the 
questionnaire, a random round was chosen to calculate their final payment. 
Participants were paid with a sealed envelope which contained the cash. Including the 
25 RMB show-up fee, each subject earned on average 50 RMB (about 8 USD). This 
is higher than the average wage of 25 RMB an hour for jobs on this campus. 
 
3. Theoretical predictions 
Our analysis focuses on the reciprocating behavior of the recipient. We outline 
predictions of related theories on B’s behavior.  
Standard homo economicus theory, which assumes that all individuals are only 
concerned about personal payoffs, predicts that the recipient should repay zero to the 
beneficiary. Besides, complete anonymity guarantees that there is no reputation 
concern.
12
 This could serve as our benchmark hypothesis. 
                                           
12 Some subjects may have the strategic motivations in interactions, such as encouraging the donor (recipient) to 
transfer (repay) in the future, or group reputation concerns even in the absence of disclosure of group identity. But 
it should be limited because relative to the size of the group, the behavior of a single subject has limited influence. 
We also do not observe any decline of reciprocating behavior, indicating no evidence for this motivation as a 
major force.  
Selfishness hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi , will be zero for all transfers 
in all treatments. 
The selfishness hypothesis is often violated in the standard investment game as 
recipients will return a significant amount of money to donors. There are many 
theories of reciprocity in the bilateral setting, and some of them can be naturally 
extended to the case of non-strategic indirect reciprocity. In this paper, we also would 
like to test whether the recipient cares about fair outcome as prescribed in outcome-
based social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002), whether the selfish or altruistic type of the third party is 
important (Levine, 1998; Strassmair, 2009; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2010), and whether 
the recipient wants to avoid disappointing the donor (Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006). Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) develop the models of 
intention-based reciprocity, based on the premise that people like to return those who 
help them and punish those who hurt them. However, it is not immediately clear how 
to formally apply these models to our setting, because by definition the beneficiary 
does not take any action that affects the payoff of the recipient, so there is no intention 
to be revealed.  In effect, if we insist on theories of intention-based reciprocity, then 
the derived theoretical predictions would be the same as the selfishness hypothesis 
that the repayment would be zero. 
Outcome-based social preferences assume that individuals are altruistic and care 
about fairness in various forms, e.g., the equity of final payoff distributions, social 
welfare. This motivation may affect the level of Yi because as Ai gave more to Bi, the 
payoff distribution is more uneven, and this inequality may motivate Bi to transfer 
more. However, this theory does not predict any significant impact of social 
connections, because they do not directly affect the payoff distribution. This theory 
may predict more transfer by Bi when a message is sent, since a costly message would 
change the payoff distribution. But, the change should be marginal since it only costs 
Ai  1 RMB.  
Outcome-based social preferences hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi, does 
not vary with social connections but may increase marginally with messages.  
There are abundant experimental evidence that expressed preferences might 
affect reciprocating behavior (Charness and Rabin, 2005; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 
2004). Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) stress that people may exhibit guilt aversion, 
i.e., people strive to live up to others’ (selfish or not) expectations so as to avoid guilt. 
In our setting, the recipient might respond to the expectation of donors or 
beneficiaries. However, only in the Message Treatment the donor has the opportunity 
to directly express her hope. Thus, if a message is delivered to the recipient, he forms 
the belief that the donor expects him to repay more to the beneficiary. Consequently, 
he will repay more to the beneficiary. In the Connection Treatment, since Ai did not 
learn about her social relations with Ak, there should be no difference in Ai’s 
expressed expectations between this treatment and the Baseline Treatment, so there is 
no reason for the recipient to repay more.  
Guilt aversion hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi, will be higher if the 
donor sends a message but will not vary in other treatments.  
Type-based reciprocity (Levine 1998) assumes that people are either selfish or 
altruistic. Selfish type always cares about self interest, and altruistic type also cares 
about others’ welfare conditioning on other people being altruistic as well. If Ai gives 
a large amount to Bi, then it is a clear signal of altruistic type. Similarly, sending a 
costly message asking for a favor to Ak is also a strong signal of Ai’s altruistic type. 
However, these signals do not directly reveal Ak’s type and so Yi should not depend 
on these factors. 
Most researchers in social and economic networks view social ties as the 
structure in which players interact with each other (Jackson, 2008). However, in the 
view of some sociologists, social ties might serve as a device to signaling unobserved 
characteristics (Podolny, 1993).  The status in a social hierarchy may flow through 
social ties, in the sense that a player’s ties to higher-status actors enhance the others’ 
perception of her prestige. In our setup, this logic would imply that recipients might 
perceive that a friend of a nice person is more likely a kind guy. Therefore, if we 
make a further assumption that connected people are more likely to be of the same 
type, e.g., recipients treat the payoff of a group of friends as a whole,
13
 then we might 
obtain an extended type-based reciprocity hypothesis that predicts that Yi depends on 
social connections. 
 Type-based hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi, does not vary with social 
connections and messages.  
Extended Type-based hypothesis: If we assume that connected people are more 
likely to be of the same type, then Yi will be higher if Xi is large and Ai and Ak are 
friends. 
 
4. Results 
Figure 4 graphs the player Ai’s transfer and Bi’s repayment across the four 
treatments. It is straightforward to observe a monotonic relationship in all treatments: 
the more the player Ai transferred, the more the player Bi was likely to send back. In 
the treatments of indirect reciprocity, there are about 17%, 20% and 15% of the 
observed A’s transfer equalizing zero under the Baseline, Connection, and Message 
treatments, respectively. Conditioning on receiving a positive transfer from A, about 
16%, 19% and 21% of the observed B’s repayment were zero under the three 
treatments. These results suggest roughly the percentage of pure selfish behavior in 
our observations. There are two players in the Baseline Treatment and one player in 
the Connection Treatment who consistently gave 30 RMB, which was their entire 
endowment. We delete them due to the consideration of outliers. We can infer from 
Figure 4: 
Result 1. A significant number of subjects exhibit pure indirect reciprocal 
behavior. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate player Ai’s and player Bi’s average transfer by 
round for the four treatments, respectively. In general, there is no clear trend across 
                                           
13 Maximiano et al. (2013) study indirect reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment. Their focus is whether the 
separation of firm owners (beneficiaries) and managers (donors) affects the worker’s effort contribution. Their 
results support the hypothesis that workers treat the firm as a whole, thus ignore that the manager’s payoff is 
independent of the reciprocal behavior. However, in their work this hypothesis is derived from the fact that the 
owner is the one who affords the cost of gift, thus, it might be natural that workers consider the owner as a donor. 
rounds, suggesting that our random re-matching and anonymous interaction might 
successfully prevent learning effects. In Figure 5, we see that player Ai’s transfer is on 
average significantly higher under the Direct reciprocity Treatment than in the other 
three treatments, indicating more trust in bilateral interactions. However, in Figure 6 
we do not see such a big difference in terms of player Bi’s repayment.  
Figure 7 further summarizes the amount of player Bi’s repayment across 
treatments and situations. We see that the average Ai transfer is 12.4 in the Direct 
reciprocity Treatment, 5.6 in the Baseline Treatment, 4.9 in the Connection Treatment, 
and 5.2 in the Message Treatment. The corresponding average Bi repayment is 8, 3.4, 
6.7 and 3.1, respectively. Thus, the reciprocity ratio in the Connections Treatment is 
significantly higher than that in other treatments. The important message comes from 
Figure 8. It is shown that if Ai and Ak were friends, the average repayment is 8.7, 
significantly higher than the average repayment under the treatment. Given that Ai and 
Ak were friends, we further divide the sample by whether Ai’s transfer is higher or 
lower than 5, the median of all observed A’s transfer. We observe that when Ai 
transferred high, Bi’s average repayment was as high as 16.5,  whereas provided with 
low Ai transfer Bi on average reciprocated only about 5, slightly lower than the 
situation that Ai and Ak were not friends. The amount of Bi’s repayment is slightly 
higher if Ai sent a message, and this increase occurs mostly when Ai gave high 
transfer. Overall, we observe a strong connection effect and a weak message effect. 
We first examine the connection effect in more details. Table 1 reports the results 
of panel data analysis using observations from the Connection Treatment only. The 
dependent variable is Bi’s repayment, and the independent variables include Ai’s 
transfer, a dummy variable “Friend” indicating that Ai and Ak were friends, and the 
interaction term between these two. Whether controlling for the possible nonlinearity 
in the transfer-repayment relationship does not affect our treatment effect.  
Consistent with the Result 1, across all columns we observe a significantly 
positive effect of Ai’s transfer. For every unit increase in Ai’s transfer, Bi’s repayment 
increases by about 0.9 unit in Column (1)--(3) and 0.6 in Column (4), significantly 
different from zero at the 95% confidence level. In Column (1) we only add Ai’s 
transfer and the Friend dummy. However, we do not observe that Bi’s repayment was 
higher if Ai and Ak were friends. This result remains even after we control for the 
round dummy and the subject dummy in Column (2) and (3). 
14
 
Overall we do not observe any significant effects of simply being friends. 
However, when we add the two-way interaction term between Ai’s transfer and the 
Friend dummy in Column (4), we obtain a significant interaction term. The coefficient 
of 0.623 on this two-way interaction term implies that a beneficiary, who was also a 
friend of the donor, received 0.62 RMB more repayment from the recipient for every 
one more RMB initial transfer. Based on Table 1, we make the crucial observation: 
Result  2. If a donor has transferred more to a recipient, the latter will repay 
more to a beneficiary who is a friend of the donor than to the one who is a stranger. 
                                           
14 Therefore, we could preclude the possible demand effect, which predicts that Bi would have reacted to the 
information of being friends from the experimenters by increasing repayments. 
This suggests that the impact of social ties crucially depends on whether the 
donor has released enough kindness. The more Ai gave, the more likely that Bi will 
reciprocate to Ai’s friend. In fact, when Ai gave only a very small amount, being 
friends even decreases Bi’s giving by 2.433, although this negative spillover effect is 
not statistically significant. Result 2 establishes the strong positive spillover effect of 
social ties. 
Now we turn to examine the effect of messages. Table 2 reports the estimation 
result of a regression that is similar to the one reported in Table 1, but uses 
observations from the Message Treatment only and includes the dummy variable 
“Message” to represent whether a message was received. In this treatment, about 46% 
of the subjects chose to send a structured message despite its cost. 
We again observe the significantly positive impact of Ai’s transfer on Bi’s 
repayment, but the magnitude of the impact is slightly smaller than that in the 
Connection Treatment. Surprisingly, the fact that Ai sent a costly message, which 
requests Bi for a favorable treatment on Ak, does not produce any significant effects 
on B’s repayment. Although the coefficients on the variable Message and the two-
way interaction term between Message and Ai’s transfer are both positive, these 
coefficients are not significant at all. Considering Table 2 and Figure 8, we observe: 
Result 3. Receiving binary messages does not have any significant effects on the 
reciprocal acts. 
We would like to compare outcomes in the Connection and the Message 
Treatments to the Baseline. Simply having the opportunity to learn about the 
friendship status and send a message might potentially change player Ai’s and Bi’s 
behavior. For instance, learning that Ai and Ak are not friends could be quite different 
from knowing nothing about the connections between them. While the former signals 
social relations, the latter situation is neutral. The fact that Ai did not send a message 
when she has the opportunity may signal to B about Ai’s type, but not allowing Ai to 
communicate does not reveal this.  
Table 3 reports the econometric analysis result. In this regression, we cannot 
control for the subject dummy because we have different subjects across different 
treatments. The subject dummy and any treatment effects cannot be separately 
indentified.  
Column (1) and (2) of Table 3 includes observations from the Connection 
Treatment and the Baseline, whereas Column (3) and (4) compare the Message 
Treatment to the Baseline. To avoid being driven by outliers, we drops observations 
related to those Ai who transferred her entire wealth. In addition to the Friend and 
Message dummy variables, we include the other two dummies “Friend Treatment” 
and “Message Treatment” to indicate that the observation is from the corresponding 
treatment.  
Result  4: Social connections induce recipients to repay more to a friend of a 
donor. There is no evidence that recipients discriminate against a “stranger” 
beneficiary in the Connection Treatment. 
Column (1) suggests that B’s repayment in the Connection Treatment is 
significantly higher than that in the Baseline, after controlling for Ai’s initial transfer. 
When we additionally add the Friend dummy in Column (2), the significant 
coefficient of this dummy suggests that compared to the Baseline Treatment, knowing 
that Ai and Ak are friends significantly increases B’s transfer by 2.557 RMB. However, 
knowing they are not friends does not generate a different result from the Baseline 
Treatment, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient of the “Friend Treatment” 
dummy. Combine the results with Figure 8, it implies that the observed significant 
impact of social relations in the Connection Treatment is mainly driven by that 
recipients are inclined to be nicer to a friend of a kind donor. However, recipients do 
not discriminate against a “stranger” of a donor. Actually, as Figure 7 demonstrates, 
we find that the Friend Treatment almost doubles B's indirect reciprocity ratio 
compared to the Baseline. Therefore, there is no evidence that introducing social 
networks in a “society” benefits the connected persons, on the expense of the welfare 
of the strangers. 
Similarly, in Column (3) and Column (4) we also do not observe significant 
differences of the Message Treatment from the Baseline Treatment, either in terms of 
the average transfer level or whether there was a message sent. This is consistent with 
Result 3.   
 
5.  Discussions 
Our econometric analysis demonstrates the significant impact of social 
connections. The magnitude of the indirect impact of connections on recipients’ 
reciprocal behavior crucially depends on donors’ transfer in the first place. Higher 
Ai’s initial transfer leads to stronger spillover effects of connections. However, the 
effect of message is not significant and does not vary with Ai’s transfer. We also have 
the robust finding that Ai’s transfer significantly increases Bi’s transfer in all 
treatments. These results provide some evidence to understand the motivations of 
indirect reciprocal behavior.  
The fact that Ai’s transfer is strongly correlated with Bi’s repayment under all 
treatments makes it clear that the recipient’s reciprocal acts can be extended to an 
anonymous third party who didn’t help him before. Therefore, the selfishness 
hypothesis is rejected. On the other hand, outcome-based social preferences can 
explain this monotonic transfer-repayment relationship pretty well, because higher Xi 
makes the payoff distribution more unequal. However, this theory cannot explain the 
significant impact of friendship status between Ai and Ak, because this has no impacts 
on the player’s outcome distribution.15 Besides, this theory also makes the prediction 
that messages have marginal positive effects on repayment, which is not supported in 
our results. Therefore, the outcome-based social preferences hypothesis is not fully 
supported.  
                                           
15 Noteworthy, Cox et al (2007) developed a tractable model which incorporates the emotional state. In their 
model, when treated nicely by another, the agent’s emotional state becomes positive and he gains utility from the 
other’s payoffs, and vice versa. This could explain the positive correlation between transfers and repayments, but 
could not shed lights on the role of social connections. As a complementary, our findings might suggest that the 
target of the influences of the emotional state is based on certain social networks. Beneficiaries of closer social 
distance to the donor are more likely to be affected by the emotion state of the recipient. 
Guilt aversion model has the potential to explain the significant effects of social 
connections. Noteworthy, if we assume that there is a social norm that expects the 
recipient to repay more to friends of kind donors, this expectation as well as 
recipients’ beliefs of this expectation might affect indirect reciprocal acts. However, 
this explanation implies that even the implicit expectation derived from contextual 
social norms matters. If it is the case, donors’ costly expressed expectations would 
have been more salient as expected. Our Message Treatment thus provides a setting to 
test guilt aversion hypothesis. Though we didn’t directly elicit the players’ first-order 
and second-order beliefs, sending a costly structured message clearly indicates the 
donor’s expectations in our setting. However, the coefficient of the “Message” 
dummy is insignificantly different from zero. Hence, the guilt-aversion hypothesis 
receives limited support from our data. This also casts doubts on the role of guilt 
aversion in the situation of indirect interactions. 
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The original version of type-based hypothesis suggests that the reciprocal 
behavior is affected by whether the other party is of altruistic or selfish type. Thus, it 
predicts that repayments will be the same across all treatments, since the beneficiaries 
have no chance to signal their types. This is not supported by our results.  But, the 
extended type-based hypothesis that assumes that members of the same club tend to 
have the same selfish or altruistic type is consistent with the significant impact of 
social relations.  
However, the consistency of our results and the theoretical predictions doesn’t 
lead to the full confidence in this hypothesis. Clearly, we need to test whether the 
conjectured channel is valid before accepting the reasoning. We would like to know 
whether there is any significant difference in the within and between-group 
correlations of donors/beneficiaries’ actual transfer behavior. We run a one-way 
analysis-of-variance on Xi across two clubs in the Connection Treatment. The 
calculated between-group mean squared error is 1.2, while the within-group mean 
squared error is 66.2. Hence, most of the variation of Xi comes from the within-group 
difference. Even though it is possible that subjects in the role of recipient might 
perceive that the friendship status signals the similar type, there is no evidence that 
members of the same club acted as if they were of the same type. Therefore, we think 
that neither version of type-based hypothesis can provide a convincing explanation of 
the strong effect of social connections.  
The most prominent models of reciprocity in bilateral interactions, including 
intention-based, guilt-aversion, and type-based, all rely on modeling the agent’s belief 
system, e.g., whether the second mover believes in the first mover’s good intention, 
kind type, or avoids her disappointment. But our experimental results suggest that this 
approach could not be naturally extended to the context of multilateral interaction, 
belief system might play a minor role in indirect reciprocal behavior. 
The most salient observations from our experiment are that social connections 
between the donor and the beneficiary have significant positive spillover effects on 
indirect reciprocal behavior. Unfortunately, none of the prominent theories of social 
preferences can provide satisfactory explanation. Recently, Malmendier and Schmidt 
                                           
16 Ellingsen et al. (2010) investigated guilt aversion in bilateral interactions controlling for consensus effects, and 
concluded that guilt aversion appears to play a relatively minor role in their experiments. Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2010) suggest that only the free-form communication might affect the beliefs of the players. 
(2012) propose a theoretical model to explain the reciprocal behavior in the presence 
of negative externalities. Following the ideas in the anthropological and sociological 
literature where reciprocity is an internalized social norm,
17
 they extend standard 
outcome-based social preferences by endogenizing the reference group. Decision 
maker is assumed to care about the weighted sum of one’s own consumption utility 
and others’ utilities, but the weights attached to others’ welfare are conditional on 
people’s actions. If their actions are “nicer” than expected, then the weights attached 
to their welfare are also higher.  
Our preferred explanation is an extension of their idea of endogenous reference 
group. We assume conditional outcome-based altruism, in which conditional on the 
others’ previous actions, decision maker derives utilities from increasing the others’ 
welfare. In our set-up, we assume that these welfare weights are monotonically related 
to the degree of social connections. Social connections should have two important 
features: First, social connections can be endogenous to actions such as gift giving. In 
our setting, an unexpected large amount of Ai’s giving strengthens the social ties 
between Ai and Bi. Second, social connections have the property of transitivity. In 
other words, if Ai is socially close to Bi, and Ai socially close to Ak, then Bi feels 
socially close to Ak.  This transitivity creates a sense of in-group and out-group bias 
based on social networks. The donor’s large transfer increases the level of recipients’ 
intrinsic care about donors. Knowing the donor and the beneficiary were friends, the 
recipient raises his care about beneficiaries as well. As a result, recipients are more 
willing to repay to the beneficiary. Literally, friends of friends are also my friends. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have conducted a laboratory experiment to examine the 
behavioral motivations underlying indirect reciprocity. In our experimental one-shot 
indirect investment game, the donor and the beneficiary are not the same person, the 
social connections between the donor and the beneficiary might vary, and the donor 
might have the opportunity to send a message to the recipient to express her 
expectations.  We introduce real social relations in our experiment by using naturally 
occurring friends to proxy different degree of social distance.  
We provide clear evidence for the existence of pure indirect reciprocal behavior. 
Moreover, we show that social connections have spillover effects in that they 
significantly affect recipients’ reciprocal behavior. However, they operate in a 
conditional way in that close social ties pays off only if the donor has been kind to the 
recipient. This doesn’t sacrifice the welfare of the unconnected people. On the other 
hand, expressed expectations play a relatively minor role in affecting the reciprocal 
acts in our experiment. This undermines the role of belief system, which is the driving 
force in most prominent theories of reciprocity, in explaining indirect reciprocal 
behavior. 
We derive hypothesis from competing models of social preferences, including 
outcome-based theories, intentions-based theories, guilt-aversion theories, and type-
based theories. However, it is shown that none of them succeeds in providing 
                                           
17 See the footnote 25 and 26 of their paper for the references  in anthropology, sociology, and economics. 
satisfactory explanations.  Therefore, based on the idea of conditional altruism in 
Malmendier and Schmidt (2012), we propose an explanation based on in-group and 
out-group differences of social preferences, but with the group formation 
endogenously determined by initial transfers, and group status flows along social ties.  
Most human interactions are embedded into certain social networks, and there is 
a large body of literature investigating the role of social ties in economic interactions. 
Our results suggest that, in addition to facilitating information transmission, 
punishment enforcement, risk sharing, etc., social connections play an important role 
in determining the target and strength of reciprocal behavior. Thus, an implication of 
our work is that social ties significantly expand the scope of reciprocal acts even in 
the absence of any strategic incentives, consequently facilitate sustaining mutual 
cooperation in a large group. 
In our experiment, we only examine a certain type of naturally occurring social 
relations: club membership. It would be interesting to learn the impact of different 
types of social ties. We use naturally occurring friendship to overcome the failure of 
commonly used group formation procedure in China due to the collectivist cultural 
inclination (Buchan et al, 2006). To what extent the culture contributes to the 
significant role of social ties in reciprocal behavior still waits for future research. 
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Table 1 Friend Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Bi's Transfer 
   
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ai's transfer 0.884*** 0.908*** 0.904*** 0.572** 
 
[0.216] [0.214] [0.184] [0.225] 
Friend 2.307 2.061 0.688 -2.433 
 
[1.823] [1.799] [1.328] [1.854] 
Friend*Ai's transfer 
   
0.623** 
 
   
[0.285] 
Constant 1.466 0.916 -4.945*** -3.638** 
 
[1.384] [2.033] [1.583] [1.509] 
     Round dummy 
 
√ √ √ 
Subject dummy 
  
√ √ 
Adjusted R-squared 0.272 0.306 0.761 0.787 
Observations 78 78 78 78 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Table 2 Message Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Bi's Transfer 
   
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ai's transfer 0.251** 0.251** 0.188* 0.135 
 
[0.109] [0.103] [0.094] [0.112] 
Message 0.424 0.429 0.219 -0.283 
 
[0.769] [0.774] [0.732] [1.139] 
Message*Ai's transfer 
   
0.096 
 
   
[0.204] 
Constant 1.632** 1.274 0.589 0.987 
 
[0.790] [1.010] [1.256] [1.243] 
     
Round dummy 
 
√ √ √ 
Subject dummy 
  
√ √ 
Adjusted R-squared 0.099 0.168 0.445 0.581 
Observations 84 84 84 84 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Table 3 Compare the Friend and the Message Treatment to the Baseline 
Dependent Variable: Bi's Transfer 
  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ai's transfer 0.626*** 0.616*** 0.385*** 0.383*** 
 
(0.148) (0.147) (0.108) (0.108) 
Friend Treatment 3.557* 2.535 
  
 
(1.778) (1.674) 
  Friend 
 
2.557* 
  
 
 
(1.316) 
  Message Treatment   -0.255 -0.454 
 
  
(0.903) (1.120) 
Message 
   
0.426 
 
   
(1.078) 
Constant -1.264 -1.105 0.505 0.481 
 
(1.297) (1.286) (0.936) (0.937) 
     
Round dummy √ √ √ √ 
Adjusted R-squared 0.284 0.298 0.221 0.222 
Observations 172 172 178 178 
Note: Standard errors clustered by subjects  are reported in parentheses with *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We cannot control for subject dummy in these regressions because 
different treatments consist of different subjects, and so the treatment effect is not 
identifiable if we control for subject dummy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Design of the Baseline Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Design of the Connection Treatment 
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Figure 3: Design of the Message Treatment 
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Figure 4: Player Ai’s and Bi’s Transfer Summary 
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Figure 5: Player Ai’s Average Transfer by Round  
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Figure 6: Player Bi’s Average Transfer by Round 
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Figure 7: The Average Ai 's and Bi’s Average  Transfer  by Treatment 
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Figure 8: The Average Ai 's and Bi’s Average  Transfer  by High and Low A's transfers 
 
